The idea that the autocracy might have successfully modernized itself has, in recent years, spread widely beyond academic circles. However, a look at traditional and recent historiography shows that very few historians support this line. Even those who argue that Russia itself was developing rapidly have seen little prospect of the autocracy surviving the process. Equally, those who argue that radical socialist revolution might have been avoided tend to suggest, often by implication rather than in an explicit fashion, that a democratic, capitalist, bourgeois, and constitutional revolution was the alternative path. Thus it was not so much a question of tsarism or revolution but rather what kind of revolution was Russia facing?
II
By the I970s the idea that socialist revolution might have been avoided was spreading and the hopes of liberals were being talked up. The collectively authored volumes Russia enters the twentieth century8 and Russia under the last tsar9 showed the degree to which the new ideas were taking root. The latter volume brought together Mendel -who declared himself' undecided' as to whether he was an optimist or a pessimist 'although I strongly incline to the former'0 -and one of the arch-pessimists of the time, Theodore von Laue.ll A number of monographs began to focus on liberalism and conservatism in a more positive light. In the forefront were Richard Pipes's superb biography of Peter Struve (accompanied by a collection of his works), Robert Byrnes on Pobedonostsev, and Geoffrey Hosking's careful study of the Third and Fourth Dumas.l2
In the turmoil of the sixties and early seventies, however, such voices were by no means unchallenged. The fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, celebrated in 1967, probably marked one of the high peaks of its prestige in the west in that there was still some sympathy for its fundamentally 'progressive' nature and for its hero-figures, Lenin and Trotsky but not the disgraced Stalin. The tendency to stress liberals and conservatives was largely dismissed by many as the work of'cold warriors' whose work was of little interest to the growing band of neo-Marxist social historians whose main aim in life was to refute the 'totalitarian' myths of the older generation. However 
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incompetence of high officials and officers born to their ranks (patricians) who stifled professionally competent meritocrats (praetorians); and the emergence of revolution from the crisis of inflation (that most fashionable of late seventies and eighties topics) unleashed by the war. Stone and others were not slow to stress the implications of these ideas. In particular, the revolution was seen as unnecessary and disruptive. Without the war, Russia was advancing, its economy developing. Given longer (Stolypin's twenty years was a favourite selection) the country would have evolved into a prosperous, capitalist, and at least semi-democratic country -it being an article of faith at the time that free markets and democracy were inseparably linked. However, Stone still severely castigated the autocracy for its incompetence and for its tendency to prolong the life of a superannuated class of administrators born to the job who blocked the path of entrepreneurs and meritocrats with whom the future of a liberal-capitalist Russia lay. A number of landmark volumes appeared which offered at least some support for a more optimistic line. Linda Edmondson and Olga Crisp, for example, edited a conference volume on Civil rights in imperial Russia.15 The editors were careful to say that 'We do not expect to overturn the prevailing view that respect for citizens' rights was poorly developed at all levels of Russian society; indeed most of the essays in the book will tend to confirm the conventional wisdom.'l6 The majority of contributors were largely pessimistic, sharing the view of one of them, W. E. Butler, that 'Full implementation of civil rights laid down in the 1906 Basic Law achieved little progress in the successive State Dumas convoked between I906 and I9I7. Sundry bills were introduced in a liberal reformist spirit, but those which were passed were either blocked in the State Council or vetoed by the Tsar. '17 But there were also more optimistic voices. Caspar Ferenczi argued that 'The constitutional reforms of I905 and I906 changed not only Russia's political institutions, but also her style of government and her political culture ... Despite continuing repression, which was further intensified in i907, public opinion succeeded in acquiring and maintaining a new breadth, and in increasing its influence over governmental decisions. 18 The editors' claim for their volume was that, in tsarist state and society, 'in spite of the unfavourable political environment, a concern for civil rights was rather more apparent than historians have been inclined to perceive'.19 The very selection of the topic of civil rights was indicative of the new direction. There was a much stronger tendency than hitherto to take tsarist legislation seriously and to study its effects more closely. Klaus Frohlich examined the liberal Constitutional Democratic party, in a more positive light than had often been the case.20 Marc Szeftel paid considerable attention to the emergence of what he considered to be genuine constitutional law and a constitutional monarchy based on the October Manifesto, even though, as he admitted, 'Complete implementation of the manifesto still had a long and difficult path before it on the eve of the collapse of the monarchy. '21 One of the positive consequences of the growing debate was that it had laid the foundations for a more complex interpretation than the caricatural view of an 15 Even more strikingly, a group of historians even began to draw attention to the longterm 'success' of tsarism, its longevity (300 years of the Romanov dynasty was longer than any other in Europe) and its stability, in surviving 1789 unscathed and being the chief bastion of reaction in continental Europe in I848. True, David Moon attributed stability and success to the remarkable expansion of the Russian peasantry, which preserved the core of its traditional culture and agrarian system despite a more than tenfold increase in population and an almost equally massive increase in area, rather than to the elite, but others were prepared to change the paradigm even further.34 For historians like David Saunders, tsarist Russia was a 'static society' surviving by not changing. The rate of modernization was increasing at the end of the nineteenth century but barely affected more than a minority of the country. In work preparatory to the production of a social history of the Russian empire from 80o I to I 9 I 7 he argued that 'the thesis I have been developing is that, contrary to appearances, the society of the later Russian Empire was not fundamentally revolutionary'.5 The traditional historians of late tsarism had been asking the wrong questions. Instead of asking why tsarism collapsed, the issues should have been, why was it so successful, why did it survive so long, and how did it absorb so much opposition?
Consideration 88 Even before the war 'As things stood, some kind of revolutionary clash was practically inevitable. '89 Social strife was continual. National resentments among the non-Russians were on the rise. Political opposition remained strident and determined. The monarchy was ever more widely perceived as an oppressive, obsolescent institution which failed to correspond to the country's needs. Nicholas II had been almost overthrown in 1905. He had recovered his position, but the basic tensions in state and society had not been alleviated.90
In the light of this mass of contrary evidence how has the extreme optimist argument succeeded in surviving? Its fundamental flaw is that, having identified modernization and progress in Russia, it goes on to assume that this would have helped tsarism to survive and, in the more far-fetched versions, to equal or surpass the achievements of the early Soviet period. In reality, however, the same facts of progress could be understood as part of the rise of an as yet small middle class which, while caught up in the trammels of the state and in part dependent on it, resented that state and was only loyal to it to the degree to which the state was the unique guardian of social order. In that sense the real issue between optimists and pessimists is less the question of whether tsarism would survive. As this review has attempted to show, when looked at closely, even optimists did not hold out much hope for tsarism as it existed. Although unacknowledged by most optimists, the real question was what kind of revolution did Russia face, a bourgeois one focused on institutional reform and led by what was still a weak middle class or a radical populist one which would lead to widespread property redistribution and lead inevitably to extensive social transformation? Perhaps the secret of the enduring fascination, for many Russians and non-Russians, of the writings of those who appeared to be suggesting that tsarism might have survived is to be found in a comment made by AdrianJones: 'As any celebrity or astrologer knows, the laurels in games of soothsaying and renown do not necessarily go to those who have things right; they go to those who confirm whatever their audiences most want to hear.'91 88 Ibid., p. i8. 89 Ibid., p. 
